Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing an edge depends on the load; namely, number of players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the fact that different users may use a resource at different times and for different durations, which plays an important role in determining the costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmitting packets in a communication network, routing traffic in a road network, or processing a task in a production system, actual sharing and congestion of resources crucially depends on time.
Introduction
Network games (NGs, for short) [11, 48, 49] constitute a well studied model of non-cooperative games. The game is played among selfish players on a network, which is a directed graph. Each Consider the TNG appearing in Figure 1 . The vertices in the TNG model the routers. There are two players that model two agents, each sending a message. The source of both messages is s and the targets are u 1 and u 2 , for messages 1 and 2, respectively. The latency functions are described in the vertices, as a function of the load m; e.g., the latency function in v 2 is v2 (m) = 3m. Thus, when a single message stays in v 2 the cost for each time unit is 3, and when the two messages visit v 2 simultaneously, the cost for each of them is 6 per unit time. The network has two clocks, x and y. Clock x is reset in each transition and thus is used to impose restrictions on the time that can be spent in each router: since all transitions can be taken when 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, a message stays between 1 and 2 time units in a router. Clock y is never reset, thus it keeps track of the global time. The guards on clock y guarantee that message 1 reaches its destination by time 4 but not before time 3 and message 2 reaches its destination by time 5 but not before time 4.
Suppose the first agent chooses the timed path (s, 2), (v 1 , 1), u 1 , thus message 1 stays in s for two time units and in v 1 for one time unit before reaching its destination u 1 . Suppose the second agent chooses the path (s, 2), (v 1 , 2), (v 2 , 1), u 2 . Note that crossing an edge is instantaneous. Since both messages stay in the same vertices during the intervals I 1 = [0, 2] and I 2 = [2, 3] , the load in the corresponding vertices is 2. During interval I 1 , each of the agents pays |I 1 | · s (2) = 2 · 4 and during I 2 , each pays |I 2 | · v1 (2) = 1 · 2. Message 2 stays in v 1 alone during the interval [3, 4] and in v 2 during the interval [4, 5] , for which it pays 1 and 3, respectively. The total costs are thus 10 and 14.
m 2m 3m Before we elaborate on our contribution, let us survey relevant works, namely, extensions of NGs with temporal aspects and extensions of timed-automata to games. Extensions of NGs that involve reasoning about time mostly study a cost model in which the players try to minimize the time of arrival at their destinations (c.f., [36, 39, 47, 45] ), where, for example, congestion affects the duration of crossing an edge. These works are different from ours since we consider a QoS cost model. An exception is [36] , which studies the QoS costs. A key difference in the models is that there, time is discrete and the players have finitely many strategies. Thus, reductions to classical resource allocation games is straightforward while for TNGs it is not possible, as we elaborate below. Games on timed automata were first studied in [12] in which an algorithm to solve timed games with timed reachability objective was given. The work was later generalized and improved [5, 20, 35, 23] . Average timed games, games with parity objectives, mean-payoff games and energy games have also been studied in the context of timed automata [3, 37, 27, 21, 34] . All the timed games above are twoplayer zero-sum ongoing games. Prices are fixed and there is no notion of load. Also, the questions studied on these games concern their decidability, namely finding winners and strategies for them. TNGs are not zero-sum games, so winning strategies do not exist. Instead, the problems we study here concern rationality and stability.
The first question that arises in the context of non-zero-sum games is the existence of stable outcomes. In the context of NGs, the most prominent stability concept is that of a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE, for short) [43] -a profile such that no player can decrease her cost by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy. 5 Decentralized decision-making may lead to solutions that are
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sub-optimal for the society as a whole. The standard measures to quantify the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior is the price of stability (PoS) [11] and the price of anarchy (PoA) [38] . In both measures we compare against the social optimum (SO, for short), namely a profile that minimizes the sum of costs of all players. The PoS (PoA, respectively) is the best-case (worst-case) inefficiency of an NE; that is, the ratio between the cost of a best (worst) NE and the SO. The picture of stability and equilibrium inefficiency for standard NGs is well understood. Every NG has an NE, and in fact these games are potential games [48] , which have the following stronger property: a best response sequence is a sequence of profiles P 1 , P 2 , . . . such that, for i ≥ 1, the profile P i+1 is obtained from P i by letting some player deviate and decrease her personal cost. In finite potential games, every best-response sequence converges to an NE. For k-player cost-sharing NGs, the PoS and PoA are log k and k, respectively [11] . For congestion games with affine cost functions, PoS ≈ 1.577 [29, 2] and PoA = 5 2 [30] . In [14] , we showed that these positive results carry over to GTNGs. A key technical feature of GTNGs is that since guards refer to global time, it is easy to find an upper bound T on the time by which all players reach their destinations. Proving existence of NE follows from a reduction to NGs, using a zone-like structure [6, 18] . The introduction of clocks with resets breaks the direct reduction to NGs and questions the existence of a bound by which the players arrive at their destinations. Even with an upper bound on time, a reduction from TNGs to NGs is not likely. Consider the following example. From s 1 , the earliest absolute time at which vertex v 2 is reached is 2 following the path
, and the value of clock x at v 2 is 0. On the other hand, when v 2 is reached from s 2 following the path (s 2 , 0)(v 2 , 0), (v 2 , 2) , then at absolute time 2, the value of clock x at v 2 is 2 and the transition to vertex u is thus enabled. This leads to a spurious path
, (u, 2) which does not correspond to a valid path in th TNG. Further, to see the difficulty in finding such a bound, consider, for example, a cost-sharing game in which all players, on their paths to their targets, need to stay for one time unit in a "gateway" vertex v that costs 1 (see details in Section 6). Assume also that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Player i can only reach v in times that are multiples of p i , for relatively prime numbers p 1 , . . . , p k . The SO is obtained when all players synchronize their visits to v, and such a synchronization forces them to wait till time p 1 · . . . · p k , which is exponential in the TNG.
The lack of an upper bound on the global time in TNGs demonstrates that we need a different approach to obtain positive results for general TNGs. We show that TNGs are guaranteed to have an NE. Our proof uses a combination of techniques from real-time models and resource allocation games. Recall that a PTA assigns a price to a timed word. We are able to reduce the best-response and the social-optimum problems to and from the problem of finding cheapest runs in PTAs [19] , showing that the problems are PSPACE-complete. Next, we show that TNGs are potential games. Note that since players have uncountably many strategies, the fact that TNGs are potential games does not immediately imply existence of an NE, as a best-response sequence may not be finite. We show that there is a best-response sequence that terminates in an NE. For this, we first need to show the existence of an integral best-response, which is obtained from the reduction to PTAs. Finally, given a TNG, we find a time T such that there exists an NE in which all players reach their XX:5 destination by time T .
Preliminaries

Resource allocation games and network games
For k ∈ N, let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. A resource allocation game (RAG, for short) is R = k, E, {Σ i } i∈ [k] , { e } e∈E , where k ∈ N is the number of players; E is a set of resources; for i ∈ [k], the set strategies of Player i is Σ i ⊆ 2 E ; and, for e ∈ E, the latency function e : [k] → Q ≥0 maps a load on e to its cost under this load. A profile is a choice of a strategy for each player. The set of profiles of R is
For e ∈ E, we define the load on e in a profile P = σ 1 , . . . , σ k , denoted load P (e), as the number of players using e in P , thus load P (e) = |{i ∈ [k] : e ∈ σ i }|. The cost a player pays in profile P , denoted cost i (P ), depends on the choices of the other players. We define cost i (P ) = e∈σi e (load P (e)). Network games (NGs, for short) can be viewed as a special case of RAGs where strategies are succinctly represented by means of paths in graphs. An NG is
where V, E is a directed graph; for i ∈ [k], the vertices s i and u i are the source and target vertices of Player i; and the latency functions are as in RAGs. The set of strategies for Player i is the set of simple paths from s i to u i in N . Thus, in NGs, the resources are the edges in the graph.
We distinguish between two types of latency functions. In cost-sharing games, the players that visit a vertex share its cost equally. Formally, every e ∈ E has a cost c e ∈ Q ≥0 and its latency function is e (l) = ce l . Note that these latency functions are decreasing, thus the load has a positive effect on the cost. In contrast, in congestion games, the cost functions are non-decreasing and so the load has a negative effect on the cost. Typically, the latency functions are restricted to simple functions such as linear latency functions, polynomials, and so forth.
Timed networks and timed network games
A clock is a variable that gets values from IR ≥0 and whose value increases as time elapses. A reset of a clock x assigns value 0 to x. A guard over a set C of clocks is a conjunction of clock constraints of the form x ∼ m, for x ∈ C, ∼ ∈ {≤, =, ≥}, and m ∈ N. Note that we disallow guards that use the operators < and > (see Remark 4) . A guard of the form x∈C x ≥ 0 is called true. The set of guards over C is denoted Φ(C). A clock valuation is an assignment κ : C → IR ≥0 . A clock valuation κ satisfies a guard g, denoted κ |= g, if the expression obtained from g by replacing each clock x ∈ C with the value κ(x) is valid.
A timed network is a tuple A = C, V, E , where C is a set of clocks, V is a set of vertices, and
C × V is a set of directed edges in which each edge e is associated with a guard g ∈ Φ(C) that should be satisfied when e is traversed and a set R ⊆ C of clocks that are reset along the traversal of e.
When traversing a path in a timed network, time is spent in vertices, and edges are traversed instantaneously. Accordingly, a timed path in A is a sequence η = τ 1 , e 1 , . . . , τ n , e n ∈ (IR ≥0 × E) * , describing edges that the path traverses along with their traversal times. The timed path η is legal if the edges are successive and the guards associated with them are satisfied. Formally, there is a sequence v 0 , t 0 , . . . , v n−1 , t n−1 , v n ∈ (V ×IR ≥0 ) * ·V , describing the vertices that η visits and the time spent in these vertices, such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the following hold:
there is a clock valuation κ j that describes the values of the clocks before the incoming edge to vertex v j is traversed. Thus, κ 1 (x) = t 0 , for all x ∈ C, and for 1 < j ≤ n, we distinguish between clocks that are reset when e j−1 is traversed and clocks that are not reset: for x ∈ R j−1 , we define κ j (x) = t j−1 , and for x ∈ (C \ R j−1 ), we define κ j (x) = κ j−1 (x) + t j−1 , and (4) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have that κ j |= g j . We sometimes refer to η also as the sequence v 0 , t 0 , . . . , v n−1 , t n−1 , v n . Consider a finite set T ⊆ IR ≥0 of time points. We say that a timed path η is a T -path if all edges in η are taken at times in T . Formally, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have that τ j ∈ T . We refer to the time at which η ends as the time τ n at which the destination is reached. We say that η is integral if T ⊆ N.
A timed network game (TNG, for short) extends an NG by imposing constraints on the times at which edges may be traversed. Formally, T = k, C, V, E, { v } v∈V , s i , u i i∈ [k] includes a set C of clocks, and C, V, E is a timed network. Recall that while traversing a path in a timed network, time is spent in vertices. Accordingly, the latency functions now apply to vertices, thus v : [k] → Q ≥0 maps a load on vertex v to its cost under this load. Traversing an edge is instantaneous and is free of charge. A strategy for Player i, for i ∈ [k], is then a legal timed path from s i to u i . We assume all players have at least one strategy.
Remark. A possible extension of TNGs is to allow costs on edges. Since edges are traversed instantaneously, these costs would not be affected by load. Such an extension does not affect our results and we leave it out for sake of simplicity. Another possible extension is allowing strict time guards, which we discuss in Remark 4.
The cost Player i pays in profile P , denoted cost i (P ), depends on the vertices in her timed path, the time spent on them, and the load during the visits. In order to define the cost formally, we need some definitions. For a finite set T ⊆ IR ≥0 of time points, we say that a timed path is a T -strategy if it is a T -path. Then, a profile P is a T -profile if it consists only of T -strategies. Let t max = max(T ). For t ∈ T such that t < t max , let next T (t) be the minimal time point in T that is strictly larger than t. We partition the interval [0,
for every m ∈ (T ∪ {0}) \ {t max }. We refer to the sub-intervals in Υ as periods. Suppose T is the minimal set such that P is a T -profile. Note that Υ is the coarsest partition of [0, t max ] into periods such that no player crosses an edge within a period in Υ. We denote this partition by Υ P .
For a player i ∈ [k] and a period γ ∈ Υ P , let visits P (i, γ) be the vertex that Player i visits during period γ. That is, if π i = v 
The cost of the profile P , denoted cost(P ), is the total cost incurred by all the
A T -strategy is called an integral strategy when T ⊆ N, and similarly for integral profile. A profile P = π 1 , . . . , π k is said to end by time τ if for each i ∈ [k], the strategy π i ends by time τ . Consider a TNG T that has a cycle such that a clock x of T is reset on the cycle. It is not difficult to see that this may lead to T having infinitely many integral profiles that end by different times. A TNG T is called global if it has a single clock x that is never reset. We use GTNG to indicate that a TNG is global.
As in RAGs, we distinguish between cost-sharing TNGs that have cost-sharing latency functions and congestion TNGs in which the latency functions are non-decreasing.
Stability and efficiency
Consider a game G. For a profile P and a strategy π of player i ∈ [k], let P [i ← π] denote the profile obtained from P by replacing the strategy of Player i in P by π. A profile P is said to be a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) if none of the players in [k] can benefit from a unilateral deviation from her strategy in P to another strategy. Formally, for every Player i and every strategy π for Player i, it holds that
A social optimum (SO) of a game G is a profile that attains the infimum cost over all profiles. We denote by SO(G) the cost of an SO profile; i.e., SO(G) = inf P ∈profiles(G) cost(P ). It is well known that decentralized decision-making may lead to sub-optimal solutions from the point of view of the society as a whole. We quantify the inefficiency incurred due to self-interested behavior by the price of anarchy (PoA) [38, 44] and price of stability (PoS) [11] measures. The PoA is the worst-case inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, while the PoS measures the best-case inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium. Note that unlike resource allocation games in which the set of profiles is finite, in TNGs there can be uncountably many NEs, so both PoS and PoA need to be defined using infimum/supremum rather than min/max. Formally, Definition 2. Let G be a family of games, and let G ∈ G be a game in G. Let Γ(G) be the set of Nash equilibria of the game G.
The price of anarchy of
The price of anarchy of the family of games
The price of stability of the family of games G is P oS(G) = sup G∈G P oS(G).
The Best-Response and the Social-Optimum Problems
In the best-response problem (BR problem, for short), we ask how a player reacts to a choice of strategies of the other players. Formally, let π 1 , . . . , π k−1 be a choice of integral 6 strategies for Players 1, . . . , k − 1 in T . We look for a strategy π k that minimizes cost k ( π 1 , . . . , π k ). The choice of allowing Player k to react is arbitrary and is done for convenience of notation. In the social optimum problem (SOPT problem, for short), we seek a profile that maximizes the social welfare, or in other words, minimizes the sum of players' costs.
In this section we describe priced timed automata (PTAs, for short) [10, 17] and show that while they are different from TNGs both in terms of the model and the questions asked on it, they offer a useful framework for reasoning about TNGs. In particular, we solve the BR and SOPT problems by reductions to problems about PTAs.
From TNGs to priced timed automata
A PTA [10, 17] is P = C, V, E, {r v } v∈V , where C, V, E is a timed network and r v ∈ Q ≥0 is the rate of vertex v ∈ V . Intuitively, the rate r v specifies the cost of staying in v for a duration of one time unit. Thus, a timed path η = v 0 , t 0 , . . . , v n , t n , v n+1 in a PTA has a price, denoted price(η), which is 0≤j≤n r v · t v . The size of P is |V | + |E| plus the number of bits needed in the binary encoding of the numbers appearing in guards and rates in P.
Consider a PTA P and two vertices s and u. Let paths(s, u) be the set of timed paths from s to u. We are interested in cheapest timed paths in paths (s, u) . A priori, there is no reason to assume that the minimal price is attained, thus we are interested in the optimal price, denoted opt(s, u), which we define to be inf{price(η) : η ∈ paths(s, u)}. The corresponding decision problem, called the cost optimal reachability problem (COR, for short) takes in addition a threshold µ, and the goal is to decide whether opt(s, t) ≤ µ. Recall that we do not allow the guards to use the operators < and >. Theorem 3. [19, 32] The COR problem is PSPACE-complete for PTAs with two or more clocks. Moreover, the optimal price is attained by an integral path, i.e., there is an integral path η ∈ paths(s, u) with price(η) = opt(s, u).
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below, we reduce problems on TNGs to problems on PTAs. The reductions allow us to obtain properties on strategies and profiles in TNGs using results on PTAs, which we later use in combination with techniques for NGs in order to solve problems on TNGs.
The best-response problem
Theorem 4. Consider a TNG T with n clocks and integral strategies π 1 , . . . , π k−1 for Players 1, . . . , k −1. There is a PTA P with n+1 clocks and two vertices v and u such that there is a oneto-one cost-preserving correspondence between strategies for Player k in T and timed paths from v to u: for every strategy π k in T and its corresponding path η in P, we have cost
. . , π k−1 be a choice of timed paths for Players 1, . . . , k − 1. Note that Q can be seen as a profile in a game that is obtained from T by removing Player k, and we use the definitions for profiles on Q in the expected manner. Let T ⊆ Q be the minimal set of time points for which all the strategies in Q are T -strategies. Consider two consecutive time points a, b ∈ T , i.e., there is no c ∈ T with a < c < b. Then, there are players that cross edges at times a and b, and no player crosses an edge at time points in the interval (a, b). Moreover, let t max be the latest time in T , then t max is the latest time at which a player reaches her destination. Let Υ Q be a partition of [0, t max ] according to T . We obtain Υ Q from Υ Q by adding the interval [t max , ∞).
A key observation is that the load on all the vertices is unchanged during every interval in Υ Q . For a vertex v ∈ V and δ ∈ Υ Q , the cost Player k pays per unit time for using v in the interval δ is v (load Q (v, δ) + 1). On the other hand, since all k − 1 players reach their destination by time t max , the load on v after t max is 0, and the cost Player k pays for using it then is v (1).
The PTA P that we construct has |Υ Q | copies of T , thus its vertices are V × Υ Q . Let δ 0 = [0, b] ∈ Υ Q be the first interval. We consider paths from the vertex v = s k , δ 0 , which is the copy of Player k's source in the first copy of T , to a target u, which is a new vertex we add and whose only incoming edges are from vertices of the form u k , δ , namely, the copies of the target vertex u k of Player k. We construct P such that each such path η from v to u in P corresponds to a legal strategy π k for Player k in T , and such that cost
The main difference between the copies are the vertices' costs, which depend on the load as in the above. We refer to the n clocks in T as local clocks. In each copy of P, we use the local clocks and their guards in T as well as an additional global clock that is never reset to keep track of global time. Let δ = [a, b] ∈ Υ Q and δ = [b, c] ∈ Υ Q be the following interval. Let T δ and T δ be the copies of T that corresponds to the respective intervals. The local clocks guarantee that a path in T δ is a legal path in T . The global clock allows us to make sure that (1) proceeding from T δ to T δ can only occur precisely at time b, and (2) proceeding from u k , δ in T δ to the target u can only occur at a time in the interval δ.
We now formalize the intuition of the reduction given above. We define
where E l is a set of external edges, E i is a set of internal edges and E t is a set of target edges. Let δ 1 , . . . , δ |Υ Q | be the set of intervals arranged according to increasing inf(δ j ), i.e., for all j ∈ [|Υ Q | − 1], we have that inf(δ j ) < inf(δ j+1 ). Also for every interval δ = δ j , we represent by next(δ), the interval δ j+1 , and let τ δj = sup(δ j ). For each v ∈ V , and δ ∈ Υ Q , there is an external edge of the form v, δ , {x n+1 = τ δ }, ∅, v, next(δ) , where τ δ = sup(δ). Hence an external edge moves from copy δ to its next copy at global time τ δ . The internal edges in a copy match the ones in T . Thus, for every δ ∈ Υ Q , we have an edge e = v, δ , g, R, v , δ in E iff there is an edge e = v, g, R, v ∈ E. Also the guard and the clock reset on e are exactly the same as that of e. Note that clock x n+1 is not used in the internal edges. For each copy corresponding to δ ∈ Υ Q , there is a target edge from the vertex (u k , δ) to u with the guard x n+1 ≤ τ δ , and from the copy corresponding to the last interval δ |Υ Q | , there is an edge from (u k , δ |Υ Q | ) to u with the guard
Finally, we define the rate of a vertex v, i . Let l be the load on v during time interval δ, then the rate of v, δ is v (l + 1). Note that for every vertex v, δ |Υ Q | , in the |Υ Q |-th copy of P, the rate is
We prove that the cost of the best response strategy of Player k in T is the same as the cost of a cost optimal path in P. We consider a strategy π of Player k in T and let P = π 1 , . . . , π k and show that there is a path η in P such that cost k (P ) is the same as cost of the path η. Similarly, for a path η in P, we show that there exists a strategy π of Player k such that again cost k (P ) is the same as cost of the path η in P.
Consider the strategy π = (
Intuitively, g maps a global time τ to the ξ th copy of the TNG T in
. Suppose there are times τ r , τ r+1 , . . . , τ r+h ∈ T such that all these h + 1 times belong to the interval [
Again from the definition of f v , for v ∈ V , we can see that the cost of the timed path π in P is the same as cost k (P ). Now we consider the other direction. Consider a path
, π is the profile obtained from the strategies of the k players. From the definition of f v for each v ∈ V , it is not difficult to see that cost k (P ) is the same as the cost of the timed path η.
Note that given integral strategies of k − 1 players, an integral path in P translates to an integral strategy of Player k in T . Since it is known that a cost optimal path in P can be an integral path [19] , the best response of Player k in T is an integral strategy.
We conclude with the computational complexity of the BR problem. The decision-problem variant gets as input a TNG T , integral strategies π 1 , . . . , π k−1 for Players 1, . . ., k − 1, and a value µ, and the goal is to decide whether Player k has a strategy π k such that cost k ( π 1 , . . . , π k ) ≤ µ. Theorem 4 implies a reduction from the BR problem to the COR problem and a reduction in the other direction is easy since PTAs can be seen as TNGs with a single player. For one-clock instances, we
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show that the BR problem is NP-hard by a reduction from the subset-sum problem. Note the contrast with the COR problem in one-clock instances, which is NLOGSPACE-complete [41] .
Theorem 5. The BR problem is PSPACE-complete for TNGs with two or more clocks. For one-clock cost-sharing and congestion TNGs it is in PSPACE and NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the BR problem to and from the COR problem, which is PSPACE-complete for PTAs with at least two clocks [19] . A PTA can be seen as a one-player TNG, thus the BR problem for TNGs with two or more clocks is PSPACE-hard. For the upper bound, given a TNG T , strategies Q = π 1 , . . . , π k−1 for Players 1, . . . , k − 1, and a threshold µ, we construct a PTA P as in the proof of Theorem 4. Note that the size of P is polynomial in the size of the input and that P has one more clock than T . An optimal path in P is a best response for Player k, and such a path can be found in PSPACE.
The final case to consider is TNGs with one clock. We show that the BR problem is NP-hard for such instances using a reduction from the subset-sum problem. The input to that problem is a set of natural numbers A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } and µ ∈ N, and the goal is to decide whether there is a subset of A whose sum is µ. We start with the cost-sharing case. The game we construct is a two-player game on a network that is depicted in Figure 3 .
choose between staying in vertex v i for a duration of a i time units, and exiting the vertex through the top edge, or staying 0 time units, and exiting the vertex through the bottom edge. Finally, she must stay in v n+1 for exactly one time unit. The cost Player 1 pays for v n+1 depends on the load. If she stays there in the global time interval [µ, µ + 1], she pays 1/2, and otherwise she pays 1. Thus, Player 1 has a strategy with which she pays 1/2 iff there is a subset of A whose sum is µ, and we are done. The reduction for congestion games is similar. Recall that in congestion games, the cost increases with the load, thus a player would aim at using a vertex together with as few other players as possible. The network is the same as the one used above. Instead of two players, we use three players, where Players 2 and 3 have a unique strategy each. Player 2 must stay in v n+1 in the time interval [0, µ] and Player 3 must stay there during the interval [µ + 1, 1≤i≤n a i ]. As in the above, Player 1 has a strategy in which she uses v n+1 alone in the time interval [µ, µ + 1] iff there is a subset of A whose sum is µ.
The social-optimum problem
Theorem 6. Consider a TNG
. There is a PTA P with k · |C| clocks, |V | k vertices, and two verticess andū such that there is a one-to-one cost-preserving correspondence between profiles in T and paths froms toū; namely, for a profile P and its corresponding path η P , we have cost(P ) = price(η P ).
Proof. First, we show how to construct, given a TNG T with self loops, a TNG T that has no self loops. Consider a vertex v that has a self loop e = v, g, R, v in T . In T , we remove e, we add a vertex v , a new clock x and "redirect" e to v while resetting x. Formally, we have the edge v, g, R ∪ {x}, v . We enforce that v is left instantaneously using an edge v , {x = 0}, ∅, v . Clearly, the strategies of the players in T and T coincide.
Recall that the social optimum is obtained when the players do not act selfishly, rather they cooperate to find the profile that minimizes their sum of costs. Let T = k, C, V, E, { v } v∈V , s i , u i i∈ [k] . We construct a PTA P by taking k copies of T . For i ∈ [k], the i-th copy is used to keep track of the timed path that Player i uses. We need k copies of the clocks of T to guarantee that the individual paths are legal. Recall that the players' goal is to minimize their total cost, thus for each point in time, the price they pay in P is the sum of their individual costs in T . More formally, consider a vertexv = v 1 , . . . , v k in P and let Sv ⊆ V be the set of vertices that appear inv. Then, the load on a vertex v ∈ Sv inv is loadv(v) = |{i : v i = v}|, and the rate ofv is v∈Sv v (loadv(v)). We show below that the cost of the social optimum in T coincides with the price of the optimal timed path in P from s 1 , . . . , s k to the vertex u 1 , . . . , u k , i.e., the vertices that respectively correspond to the sources and targets of all players. Towards this, we show that for every path η in the PTA P, there exists a profile P η in T such that price(η) in P equals cost(P η ) in T . Consider a timed We claim that π i is a legal path, i.e., we claim that the respective guards are satisfied when the path switches between vertices by crossing the edges. Consider an index 1 ≤ l ≤ m. We can prove by induction on the length of π i that for every clock x ∈ C, the value of x after the prefix v v 1 , t 1 , . . . , v j l , t j l of η. We note that from the way we construct the set R of clocks that are reset along an edge of the PTA P, clock x, i can only be reset exactly at the times at which x is reset in π i . Finally, let
is not hard to see that cost(P η ) = price(η).
Showing correctness of the other direction of the reduction is dual; namely, given a profile P = π 1 , . . . , π k in T we construct a path η froms toū in P such that cost(P ) = price(η).
We turn to study the complexity of the SOPT problem. In the decision-problem variant, we are given a TNG T and a value µ and the goal is to decide whether there is a profile P in T with cost(P ) ≤ µ. Theorem 6 implies a reduction from the SOPT problem to the COR problem, and, as in the BR problem, the other direction is trivial. For one-clock instances, we use the same NPhardness proof as in the BR problem.
Theorem 7.
The SOPT problem is PSPACE-complete for at least two clocks and it is NP-hard for TNGs with one clock.
Proof. In [19] , the COR problem was shown to be in PSPACE as follows. Given a PTA P = C, V, E, {r v } v∈V , they construct a weighted discrete graph, which is an extension of the region graph [7] . Let R P denote the region graph of P. Then, the size of the weighted directed graph of P is at most (|C| + 1) · |R P |. The size of the region graph is O(χ |C| · |C|! · |V |), where χ is the maximum constant appearing in the guards on the edges of P. Note that the size of this weighted discrete graph is exponential in the size of P and the length of a cost optimal path is bounded by the number of vertices in the weighted discrete graph. Further the encoding of the cost of a cost optimal path can be done in PSPACE. Hence one can decide in NPSPACE, thus in PSPACE, the COR problem.
, let P be the PTA constructed in the proof of Theorem 6. Recall that P has k|C| clocks and |V | k vertices and an SO in T corresponds to an optimal path η in P and the cost of the SO profile equals the cost of the path η. We note that the size of the weighted discrete graph for P is exponential in the size of the input T . Since the cost of an SO in T equals the cost of a cost optimal path in P, the PSPACE-membership of the SOPT problem follows. It remains to prove that the SOPT problem is PSPACE-hard. In [1] , the reachability problem for timed automata (which we call here timed networks) with only equality operators on the guards, has been shown to be PSPACE-complete. Given a timed network A = C, V, E , an initial and final vertex s and u in V respectively, we construct a one player
All the vertices apart from v are free vertices while v (1) = 1 such that the only player has a strategy that costs less than or equal to 0 iff there is a path from s to u in A. Note that in a one-player game, the social optimum is the strategy (which is a timed path) that minimizes the cost of the player. The vertices s and u are the fresh initial and target vertices respectively and connect s to s and u to u. Thus, if there is a path from s to u in A, then Player 1 has a strategy with cost 0. Otherwise, if there is no path from s to u in A, then the cost of the strategy that uses v is 1.
For the lower bound of one-clock instances, we revisit the NP-hardness proof of the BR-problem in Theorem 5. For a cost-sharing TNG, we note that an SO with cost no more than 1 exists iff there is a solution to the subset-sum problem. The proof for congestion TNG is analogous.
Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
The first question that arises in the context of games is the existence of an NE. In [14] , we showed that GTNGs are guaranteed to have an NE by reducing every GTNG to an NG. We strengthen the result by showing that every TNG has an NE.
In order to prove existence, we combine techniques from NGs and use the reduction to PTA in Theorem 4. A standard method for finding an NE is showing that a best-response sequence converges: Starting from some profile P = π 1 , . . . , π k , one searches for a player that can benefit from a unilateral deviation. If no such player exists, then P is an NE and we are done. Otherwise, let π i be a beneficial deviation for Player i, i.e., cost
is considered next and the above procedure repeats.
A potential function for a game is a function Ψ that maps profiles to costs, such that the following holds: for every profile P = π 1 , . . . , π k , i ∈ [k], and strategy π i for Player i, we have
e., the change in potential equals the change in cost of the deviating player. A game is a potential game if it has a potential function. In a potential game with finitely many profiles, since the potential of every profile is non-negative and in every step of a best-response sequence the potential strictly decreases, every best-response sequence terminates in an NE. It is well-known that RAGs are potential games [48] and since they are finite, this implies that an NE always exists.
The idea of our proof is as follows. First, we show that TNGs are potential games, which does not imply existence of NE since TNGs have infinitely many profiles. Then, we focus on a specific best-response sequence that starts from an integral profile and allows the players to deviate only to integral strategies. Finally, we define normalized TNGs and show how to normalize a TNG in a way that preserves existence of NE. For normalized TNGs, we show that the potential reduces at least by 1 along each step in the best-response sequence, thus it converges to an NE. [k] . Recall that for a profile P , the set of intervals that are used in P is Υ P . We define a potential function Ψ that is an adaptation of Rosenthal's potential function [48] to TNGs. We decompose the definition of Ψ into smaller components, which will be helpful later on. For every γ ∈ Υ P and v ∈ V , we define Ψ γ,v (P ) =
Proof. Consider a TNG
, that is, we take the sum of |γ| · v (j) for all j ∈ [load P (v, γ)]. We define Ψ γ (P ) = v∈V Ψ γ,v (P ), and we define Ψ(P ) = γ∈Υ P Ψ γ (P ). Let for some i ∈ [k], we have P to be a profile that is obtained by an unilateral deviation of Player i to a strictly beneficial strategy π i from her current strategy in P , that is
We show that Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ) = cost i (P ) − cost i (P ). Let T and T be the minimal sets such that P and P are T -and T -profiles, respectively. Let Υ P,P be a set of intervals that refine the intervals in Υ P and
that there is no time point t ∈ T with a < t < b. On the other hand, if there exist time points
, and dually for intervals in Υ P . It is not hard to see that since Υ P,P refines Υ P and Υ P , we have γ∈Υ P,P Ψ γ (P ) = Ψ(P ) and γ∈Υ P,P Ψ γ (P ) = Ψ(P ). Consider an interval γ ∈ Υ P,P . Recall that P is obtained by letting Player i change her strategy from the one in P and the other players' strategies remain the same. Let v = visits P (i, γ) and v = visits P (i, γ). For every v = v, v , since the other players do not change their strategies, the loads stay the same over the duration γ and we have Ψ γ,v (P ) = Ψ γ,v (P ). We consider the case where v = v . Thus, Player i uses v in the interval γ in P and uses v in the same interval in P , or the other way around. Thus, we have |load v , γ) ). Now the costs of Player i in profile P and P over the duration γ are |γ|· v (load P (v, γ)) and |γ|· v (load P (v , γ)) respectively. Thus Ψ γ (P )−Ψ γ (P ) = cost γ,i (P )− cost γ,i (P ). Since we sum up for all γ ∈ Υ P,P , we get Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ) = cost i (P ) − cost i (P ), and we are done.
Recall from Theorem 4, that given a TNG, a profile P and an index i, we find the best response of Player i by constructing a PTA. If P is an integral profile, from Theorem 3, we have that the best response of Player i also leads to an integer profile. Thus we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Consider a TNG T and an integral profile P . For i ∈ [k], if Player i has a beneficial deviation from P , then she has an integral beneficial deviation.
The last ingredient of the proof gives a lower bound for the difference in cost that is achieved in a beneficial integral deviation for some player i ∈ [k], which in turn bounds the change in potential.
We first need to introduce a normalized form of TNGs. Recall that the latency function in a TNG T is of the form v : [k] → Q ≥0 . In a normalized TNG all the latency functions map loads to natural numbers, thus for every vertex v ∈ V , we have v : [k] → N. Constructing a normalized TNG from a TNG is easy. Let L be the least common multiple of the denominators of the elements in the set 
Consider a TNG T and let T be the normalized TNG that is constructed from T . It is not hard to see that for every profile P and i ∈ [k], we have cost i (P ) in T is L · cost i (P ) in T . We can thus restrict attention to normalized TNGs as the existence of NE and convergence of best-response sequence in T implies the same properties in T . In order to show that a best-response sequence converges in TNGs, we bound the change of potential in each best-response step by observing that in normalized TNGs, the cost a player pays is an integer. Lemma 10. Let T be a normalized TNG, P = π 1 , . . . , π k be an integral profile in T , and π i be a beneficial integral deviation for Player i,
We can now prove the main result in this section.
Theorem 11. Every TNG has an integral NE. Moreover, from an integral profile P , there is a best-response sequence that converges to an integral NE.
Proof. Lemma 9 allows us to restrict attention to integral deviations. Indeed, consider an integral profile P . Lemma 9 implies that if no player has a beneficial integral deviation from P , then P is an NE in T . We start best-response sequence from some integral profile P I and allow the players to deviate with integral strategies only. Consider a profile P and let P be a profile that is obtained from P by a deviation of Player i. Recall from Theorem 8 that cost i (P ) − cost i (P ) = Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ). Lemma 10 implies that when the deviation is beneficial, we have Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ) ≥ 1. Since the potential is non-negative, the best-response sequence above converges within Ψ(P I ) steps.
Remark. A TNG that allows < and > operators on the guards is not guaranteed to have an NE. Indeed, in a PTA, which can be seen as a one-player TNG, strict guards imply that an optimal timed path may not be achieved. In turn, this means that an NE does not exist. To overcome this issue, we use -NE, for > 0; an -deviation is one that improves the payoff of a player at least by , and an -NE is a profile in which no player has a -deviation. Our techniques can be adapted to show that -NE exist in TNGs with strict guards. The proof uses the results of [19] that show that an -optimal timed path exists in PTAs. The proof technique for existence of NE in TNGs with non-strict guards can then be adapted to the strict-guard case.
Equilibrium Inefficiency
In this section we address the problem of measuring the degradation in social welfare due to selfish behavior, which is measured by the PoS and PoA measures. We show that the upper bounds from RAGs on these two measures apply to TNGs. For cost-sharing TNGs, we show that the PoS and PoA are at most log k and k, respectively, as it is in cost-sharing RAGs. Matching lower bounds were given in [14] already for GTNGs. For congestion TNGs with affine latency functions, we show that the PoS and PoA are 1 + (3)/3 ≈ 1.577 and 5 2 , respectively, as it is in congestion RAGs. Again, a matching lower bound for PoA is shown in [14] for GTNGs, and a matching lower bound for the PoS remains open. Let F denote a family of latency functions and F-TNGs and F-RAGs denote, respectively, the family of TNGs and RAGs that use latency functions from this family.
Theorem 12. Consider a family of latency functions F. We have P oS(F-TNGs) ≤ P oS(F-RAGs)
and P oA(F-TNGs) ≤ P oA(F-RAGs). In particular, the PoS and PoA for cost-sharing TNGs with k players is at most log(k) and k, respectively, and for congestion TNGs with affine latency functions it is at most roughly 1.577 and 
cost(O).
We show that each element in the sequence is bounded above by P oS(cost-sharing RAGs), which implies that P oS(T ) ≤ P oS(cost-sharing RAGs), and hence P oS(cost-sharing TNGs) ≤ P oS(cost-sharing RAGs). For each j ≥ 1, we construct below an RAG R j that has P oS(R j ) = cost(N j )/cost(O), and since R j is a cost-sharing RAG, we have P oS(R j ) ≤ P oS(cost-sharing RAGs). have that e (l) = |γ| · v (l). and we define the players' strategies below. Recall that, for a profile
, and an interval γ, visits P (i, γ) denotes the vertex at which Player i stays during γ in P . We extend the definition of visits P to allow periods that occur after Player i has reached her destination, and define that the function returns u i . Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that u i is a vertex with no outgoing edges, thus the paths of the other players do not traverse u i . Player i's two strategies are n
k is an NE and we assume it is the cheapest NE in R j . Otherwise, we can alter N j to match the best NE in R j and only improve the sequence. Thus, we have P oS
Since R j is a cost-sharing RAG, we have P oS(R j ) ≤ P oS(cost-sharing RAGs), and we are done.
Time Bounds
Recall that due to resets of clocks, the time by which a profile ends can be potentially unbounded.
It is interesting to know, given a TNG, whether there are time bounds within which some interesting profiles like an NE and an SO are guaranteed to exist. Earlier we showed that every TNG is guaranteed to have an integral NE (Theorem 11) and an integral SO (Theorem 6). In this section we give bounds on the time by which such profiles end. That is, given a TNG T , we find t N E (T ), T SO (T ) ∈ Q ≥0 such that an integral NE N and an integral SO O exist in T in which the players reach their destinations by time t N E (T ) and T SO (T ) respectively. We start by showing a time bound on an optimal timed path in a PTA, and then proceed to TNGs.
Lemma 13. Consider a PTA P = C, V, E, {r v } v∈V , and let χ be the largest constant appearing in the guards on the edges of P. Then, for every s, u ∈ V , there is an integral optimal timed path from s to u that ends by time |V | · (χ + 2) |C| .
Proof. Consider an optimal integral timed path η in P that ends in the earliest time and includes no loop that is traversed instantaneously. Let v 0 , . . . , v n be the sequence of vertices that η traverses, and, for 0 ≤ i < n, let κ i be the clock valuation before exiting the vertex v i . Since η is integral, κ i assigns integral values to clocks. Note that since the largest constant appearing in a guard in P is χ, the guards in P cannot differentiate between clock values greater than χ. We abstract away such values and define the restriction of a clock valuation κ i to be
Assume towards contradiction that η ends after time |V | · (χ + 2) |C| . Then, there are 0 ≤ i < j < n
be a partition of η such that η 2 is the sub-path between the i-th and j-th indices. Consider the path η = η 1 · η 3 that is obtained from η by removing the sub-path η 2 . First, note that η is a legal path. Indeed, the restrictions of the clock valuations in η 1 and η 3 match these in η 1 and η 3 , that is, η = η 1 · η 3 . Second, since we assume that traversing the loop η 2 is not instantaneous, we know that η ends before η. Moreover, since the rates in P are non-negative, we have price(η ) ≤ price(η), and we reach a contradiction to the fact that η is an optimal timed path that ends earliest. Proof. We start with the upper bound. Consider a TNG T with a set V of vertices and a set C of clocks. By Theorem 6, we can construct a PTA P with |V | k vertices and k|C| clocks such that a social optimum of T is an optimal timed path in P. Applying Lemma 13, we are done. We turn to the lower bounds. We show that for every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player (cost-sharing and congestion) TNG T k such that T k has O(k) states, the boundaries in the guards in T k are bounded by O(k log k), and any SO in T k requires time 2 Ω(k) .
Figure 4
The time required for the SO is not polynomial.
Consider the k-player cost-sharing TNG appearing on the left of Figure 4 . Let p 1 , . . . , p k be relatively prime (e.g., the the first k prime numbers). All the vertices in the TNG have cost 0, except for v, which has some positive cost function. Each player i has to spend one time unit in v in her path from s i to u. In an SO, all k players spend this one time unit simultaneously, which forces them all to reach v at time 1≤i≤k p i . Since the i-th prime number is O(i log i) and the product of the first i prime numbers is 2 Ω(i) , we are done. We note that we could define the TNG also with no free vertices, that is vertics with 0 cost, by setting the cost in v to be much higher than those in the source vertices. For congestion games, the example is more complicated. We start with the case of two players. Consider the congestion TNG appearing on the right of Figure 4 . Assume that p 1 and p 2 are relatively prime, r s1 (1) = r s2 (1) = 0, and r s1 (2) = r s2 (2) = 1. In the SO, the two players avoid each other in their paths from s i to u i , and the way to do so is to wait p 1 · p 2 time units before the edge from s i to s 3−i is traversed. Below we generalize this example to k players. Again, we could define the TNG with no free vertices.
We generalize the 2-player congestion TNG appearing on the right of Figure 4 to an arbitrary number of players. The extension to 3 players appears in Figure 5 below. As in the case of 2 players, the cost function in the vertices s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 is 0 for load 1 and strictly positive for higher loads. In order to reach her target, Player i has to traverse 2 edges in the triangle before she can take the edge to u i . In the SO that ends at the earliest possible time, the players perform these traversals together, so the game needs time In the extension to k players, the TNG consists of a k-vertex polygon (to which the target vertices are connected), and the players have to traverse k − 1 edges in it. Doing this simultaneously requires
We proceed to derive a time bound for the existence of an NE. For a TNG T , let L T ∈ N be the smallest number such that multiplying the latency functions by L T results in a normalized TNG. Recall the SO(T ) is the cost of a social optimum in T . Proof. Recall the proof of Theorem 11 that shows that every TNG has an integral NE: we choose an initial integral profile P and perform integral best-response moves until an NE is reached. The number of iterations is bounded by the potential Ψ(P ) of P . We start the best-response sequence from a social-optimum profile O that ends earliest. By Theorem 14, there is such a profile that Next, we bound the time that is added in a best-response step. We recall the construction in Theorem 4 of the PTA P for finding a best-response move. Consider a TNG T and a profile of strategies P , where, w.l.o.g., we look for a best-response for Player k. Suppose the strategies of Players 1, . . . , k − 1 take transitions at times τ 1 , . . . , τ n . We construct a PTA P with n + 1 copies of T . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, an optimal path in P starts in the first copy and moves from copy i to copy (i + 1) at time τ i . We use the additional "global" clock to enforce these transitions. A key observation is that in the last copy, this additional clock is never used. Thus, the largest constant in a guard in the last copy coincides with χ, the largest constant appearing in T . Let η be an optimal path in P and π k the corresponding strategy for Player k. We distinguish between two cases. If η does not enter the last copy of P, then it ends before time τ n , namely the latest time at which a player reaches her destination. Then, the profile P [k ← π k ] ends no later than P . In the second case, the path η ends in the last copy of P. We view the last copy of P as a PTA. By Lemma 13, the time at which η ends is within |V | · (χ + 2)
|C| since its entrance into the copy, which is τ n . Then, P [i ← π k ] ends at most |V | · (χ + 2) |C| time units after P . To conclude, the best-response sequence terminates in an NE that ends by time O(ϕ · |V | · (χ + 2)
).
Discussion and Future Work
The model of TNGs studied in this paper extends the model of GTNGs introduced in [14] by adding clocks. From a practical point of view, the addition of clocks makes TNGs significantly more expressive than GTNGs and enables them to model the behavior of many systems that cannot be modeled using GTNGs. From a theoretical point of view, the analysis of TNGs poses different and difficult technical challenges. In the case of GTNGs, a main tool for obtaining positive results is a reduction between GTNGs and NGs. Here, in order to obtain positive results we need to combine techniques from NGs and PTAs.
We left several open problems. In Theorem 11, we describe a method for finding an integral NE through a sequence of BR moves. We leave open the complexity of finding an NE in TNGs. For the upper bound, we conjecture that there is a PSPACE algorithm for the problem. For the lower bound, we would need to find an appropriate complexity class of search problems and show hardness for that class. For example, PLS [31] , which lies "close" to P, and includes the problem of finding an NE in NGs, consists of search problems in which a local search, e.g., a BR sequence, terminates. Unlike NGs, where a BR can be found in polynomial time, in TNGs, the problem is PSPACE-complete. To the best of our knowledge, complexity classes for search problems that are higher than PLS were not studied. Further we show that the BR and SO problems for one-clock TNGs is in PSPACE and is NP-hard, leaving open the tight complexity.
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of formal verification and algorithmic game theory: logics for specifying multi-agent systems [9, 26] , studies of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair problems [25, 24, 33, 4] , and of non-zero-sum games in formal verification [28, 22] . This line of work also includes efficient reasoning about NGs with huge networks [40, 13] , an extension of NGs to objectives that are richer than reachability [16] , and NGs in which the players select their paths dynamically [15] . For future work, we plan to apply the real-time behavior of TNGs to these last two concepts; namely, TNGs in which the players' objectives are given as a specification that is more general than simple reachability or TNGs in which the players reveal their choice of timed path in steps, bringing TNGs closer to the timed games of [12, 3] .
